This paper explores the economic thinking behind the UK Coalition Government's new framework for achieving local growth and the creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England. While the government's Local Growth paper sets out ambitions to achieve greater spatial and industrial balance across England (and by implication the UK), in practice there are competing economic ideas in circulation within government which have influenced the 'base' to policy in different ways. A 'space-neutral' approach has influenced the proposed approach to planning in the National Planning Policy Framework, while variants of the New Economic Geography and recent Place-Based Approaches can be seen as having an impact in terms of documents such as Cities with its proposals for decentralisation. While recognising that policy is still evolving, we argue that so far at least there is a mismatch between the 'rhetoric' and 'policies' of local growth and its limitations in practice, due to inconsistencies in the way that different economic ideas have been adopted in practice. As a result, the paper highlights six key disconnects and limitations of the economics behind the move to LEPs. In particular, it argues that the resulting 'bottom up' configuration of LEPs can be criticised -just as Regional Development Agencies were -as having inappropriate boundaries and scales.
Introduction
It may appear to be somewhat of an over-simplification to compare British policy making in Whitehall with making a pizza. Nevertheless, there are useful parallels that can be drawn to illustrate an examination of the economics behind the Coalition government's local growth and creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPS). 1 In particular, three basic layers can be identified in both. A pizza is often completed by a scattering of cheese, which goes on top of the chosen topping, which is layered onto the base. On a visit to a restaurant we may take time to choose our favoured topping . However, in practice, it is not the topping that marks an outstanding pizza, but the quality of the cooking of its base.
Similarly, it could be argued that at a basic level, UK policy making in Whitehall involves three key elements (see Figure One) . The top layer is the presentation of the political and policy case ('rhetoric') that accompanies policy making, which is reflected in Ministerial speeches and statements and in the phrasing of the supporting policy documents. The purpose is to communicate (and sell) to a public or professional audience the direction of travel and intended policy outcomes. Supporting the 'rhetoric' are the policy initiatives ('policies') that are designed to deliver the intended outcomes.
The temptation, is to focus almost exclusively on the complex menu, variations and synergies (or not) between these top two layers. This is particularly so, as there are often inconsistencies. In their 'rhetoric', the previous Labour government emphasised their devolution and decentralisation credentials (e.g. HMT et al, 2004) . Whist there was significant devolution to Scotland, Wales and London early on, Labour's approach towards localism became increasingly 'conditional' upon meeting Whitehall's policy priorities and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were constrained in terms of what they could do and what targets they had to meet (Hildreth, 2011) .
To focus on the first two layers almost exclusively can result in missing an important lesson from the humble pizza. In parallel to the pizza base, the economic framework ('base') is the frequently neglected but crucial element which fundamentally underpins both the 'rhetoric' and the 'policies'. Whist the 'rhetoric' and the 'policies' are constantly changing, the 'base' remains remarkably constant (Richards, 2001) . Indeed, arguably until recently, since the end of the 2 nd World War there have been only three dominant paradigms in UK economic policy (Balls et al, 2006; Hildreth, 2009 ): Neo-Keynesian (post-1945 to the late 1970s); neo-classical (exogenous growth) (late 1970s to the mid1990s) and the new regional policy (mid-1990s to 2010) , which saw its roots in endogenous growth theory (ibid). 2 To follow our analogy has the 'base' changed again under local growth? And whether it has or has not, does the 'base' of economic ideas that underpin local growth fit consistently with the 'rhetoric' by which it is presented or the 'policies' by which it is operated?
Figure One -UK 'policy' model'
The Coalition stated that their aim is to implement a new framework for achieving local growth (HMG 2010 and . The 'rhetoric' is underpinned by four main themes, laid alongside the Government's overall objective of achieving long-term macro-economic stability, of which reducing the financial deficit is a key part. These include a mix of (apparently) 'space-neutral' and 'place-based' approaches:
• To realise the potential of every place;
• To shift power downwards to local communities and businesses;
• To rebalance the economy; and
• To promote efficient and dynamic markets.
Overall, this approach is summed up as follows: implications. This has shaped the direction of travel of certain policy developments, especially with regard to the National Policy Planning Framework (NPPF) (CLG, 2011) and Ministerial 'rhetoric' about relaxing planning rules, which is focusing on removing supply side constraints and bottlenecks in the South East especially. The second is the growing influence of a mix of New Economic Geography (NEG) and place-based approaches, for example in the resurgence of interest in cities.
Behind this UK context, there are broader and important international policy and academic debates, which have seen significant recent developments. These are particularly over whether the focus of sub-national policy should be 'people-based' (or 'space-neutral') or 'place-based'. The case for 'space-neutral' polices was set out by the The building blocks of the policy were macroeconomic policy management to achieve sustained stability and microeconomic policy reform to (i) establish appropriately designed institutions operating primarily at the regional level, such as RDAs, to invest in regional and local growth; and (ii) address supply side failures in the six drivers of economic growth (employment, skills, enterprise, innovation, investment and competition) at appropriate levels of intervention.
An endogenous approach was claimed for 'new regional policy':
"Britain does have the opportunity to achieve balanced growth, rising prosperity but also the opportunity to deliver higher growth and full employment not just in one region but in every region, and city of our country. (Balls, 2000) However, in practice, despite the 'rhetoric' behind policy, it was largely pursued through RDAs that were in practice rather more accountable to Whitehall than they were to regions and localities, with top-down control and Whitehall-set targets. It was also thematic, rather than place-based, focusing on the individual contribution of each of the drivers of economic growth in the context of English regions, which were administrative rather than economic constructs. Nevertheless, there were some advantages to having RDAs. For example, the RDAs were well placed to make choices, based on local and regional intelligence, about where to get the best economic return on interventions, and from a vantage point where they could view clusters and activities that cross local authority (and now LEP) borders. Post RDAs this has become more difficult.
Local Growth -going back to the 1980s?
As noted above, beyond the overriding objective of macro-economic stability, there are four key themes of the government's local growth agenda. Firstly, there is the desire to realise the potential of every place, by that places are different and have different routes and potential to progress. A particular acknowledgement is given of the potential of English cities to "be the motors of our economic recovery" (HMG, 2010a) . Secondly, the government wishes to "shift power to local communities and businesses" (HMG, 2010), on the basis that "every place is unique and has the potential to progress" and "are best placed themselves to understand the drivers and barriers to local growth and prosperity". Places are to be offered the opportunity to tailor their approach to their local circumstances (HMG, 2010a). However, not all places will grow at the same rate or become an 'economic powerhouse'. Very early in the Administration, an invitation was sent to local authorities and business leaders to submit proposals to establish LEPs to reflect the "natural economic geography of their areas" (HMG, 2010b) . This emphasis was also reflected in the first round of 'City Deals', between the Government with each of the eight English Core Cities. 3 Here a strong emphasis was also placed on the importance of dynamic local leadership. Thirdly, an emphasis on rebalancing the economy, by reducing over-dependence on public sector employment in some parts of the country and a national over-reliance on financial services in the UK economy overall, through creating the conditions to enable private sector growth. This is underpinned by a UK infrastructure framework to focus investment in infrastructure to have a long-term impact on economic growth. Fourthly, the government aims to promote efficient markets, by introducing supply side reforms, such as to the planning system, to incentivise business and housing investment and growth.
In policy terms, the abolition of the RDAs and their effective replacement by LEPs was at the heart of this new approach. However, the precise role of LEPS was relatively 3 See DCLG Press Release on City Deals, 5th July 2012. Available at:
http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/newsroom/2173980 undefined and it could be argued that many of the functions of the former RDAs (on industrial policy, inward investment attraction, business support and so on) were, initially at least, re-centralised (Hildreth and Bailey, 2012; Froud et al, 2011) .
Meanwhile, questions remain as to whether the new LEPs really match 'functional economic geographies' in towns and cities (a point noted, inter alia -by Heseltine (2012), the CBI (2012) and Bentley et al (2010) ) and quite how they will be incentivised to cooperate.
Despite the rhetoric of a 'place-based' approach, in practice, the Coalition appears to have gone back to an earlier variation of the neo-classical framework. On the face of it, this takes us back into the world inhabited by the Thatcher government in the early 1980s, with its emphasis on reducing the state, cutting regulation and increasing competitiveness. The argument is that this creates space for private sector growth through self-correcting market adjustments in prices, wages and capital leading in turn to spatial adjustment in the movement of people and firms between places creating greater economic balance. The impact of this thinking can be seen in practice in
Enterprise Zones and the NPPF (DCLG, 2011a). 4 Further, the problem of housing supply is seen primarily in terms of planning restraints impeding market efficiency.
Fundamental questions about institutional weaknesses in the UK model of house building, which would be part of a 'place-based' approach, are not even posed. Other 'policy' differences lie in the absence of a detailed industrial policy and the centralisation of many regional (RDA) functions to Whitehall.
However, it is in the underlying framework (or 'base') where the basis for these real differences lies. One factor has already been identified -the apparent shift back to an earlier variation of the neo-classical framework. But there may be another, the emergence of 'space neutral' approaches underpinned by developments in New Economic Geography (NEG), which is discussed in the next section. This has significance, not just in the context of local growth, but also in wider international debates about the appropriate nature of sub-national policy.
Broader Debates in 'Space-Neutral' and 'Place-Based' Policy 'Space-Neutral' Approaches and the NEG As stated above, the second clue to the underpinning of local growth is the growing influence of NEG. On the face of it, there might appear to be a contradiction in the UK Government being influenced by both a neo-classical (space-neutral) and a NEG approach. Simply put, the basic neo-classical model operates in a world that is essentially economically 'flat', where convergence between regions was more likely over the long-term through self-correcting market adjustment. By contrast, NEG, whilst essentially neo-classical in its formation, adopts variations in basic assumptions that lead it to see the world as essentially 'spiky', explaining unevenness in economic activity between places through agglomeration economies that are largely related to city size.
Spatially uneven development is predicted through localised increasing return effects, raising local productivity and making particular regions (cities) increasingly attractive to firms and workers. 6 Rather than predicting convergence, NEG models suggest that it might even counter-productive to pursue geographically balanced development (e.g. see
Gardiner et al, forthcoming).
However, what is also interesting about the NEG framework is that, despite the clear recognition of the economic role of cities, it can be associated with a 'space-neutral' approach to policy making. This is most apparent in the World Development Report (World Bank, 2009 ), which advocates, within a NEG-inspired framework the promotion of agglomerations in development and the establishment of 'spatially-neutral' institutions (for example in education, health and social services) as first order solutions, supported by infrastructure to connect weaker to stronger places across distance and only very sparingly, spatially-targeted interventions as second and third order solutions respectively. In highlighting the advantages arising from the agglomeration effects of large-cities, the World Bank report essentially argues that growth and development by its very nature will be unbalanced and that efforts to spread economic activities will be counter-productive, in undermining growth and prosperity (World Bank 2009). As such, the report proposes a 'spatially blind' strategy, with policies designed "without explicit consideration to space" (World Bank, 2009; 24) . Such spatially-blind policies are in turn often seen as 'people based' in that mobility should be encouraged so that people can move to where they can be most productive (particularly cities). This enables people to live where they expect to be better off, and in so doing boosts incomes, productivity, knowledge and overall growth (World Bank, 2009 ; page 77).
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In a UK context, this World Bank report may appear to have had little direct influence.
However, a NEG framework is deployed in the UK context to make the case that spatial disparities are indeed driven by 'people' and not 'place' characteristics. 8 Given that it is hard to change 'area effects', it is then argued that it is better to focus investment on 'people' rather than 'place'. 9 Thus the case is made to prioritise the growth of successful cities (located primarily in the South East), even if this results in more uneven development within England. In this context market barriers (such as planning restrictions) are highlighted. A case is presented for universal reforms, for example in the liberalisation of planning regimes with the anticipation that greatest impact will be spatially on house building, office development and growth in the already more successful London and GSE area (Overman and Gibbons, 2011) . Nevertheless, localism is still supported under this approach, since although it may make little difference in practice to helping growth, it does facilitate and incentivise experimentation (Leunig and Swaffield, 2008) .
These arguments are partially accepted within the government's evidence paper (BIS 2010) , that was published alongside its White Paper Local Growth (HMG 2010 7 See Barca et al (2012) for an overview and assessment. 8 "The role of the individual matters as much, if not more, than the role of place" (HMG, 2010; 9) . The outcome is seen in 'Unlocking Growth in Cities' ('Cities') (HMG 2011), which offered to cities and their LEPs (particularly the Core Cities) the potential opportunity of more powers and incentives to "take their economic destiny into their own hands" and reach their full potential (HMG, 2011, foreword) . Whilst the Core Cities grasped the opportunities made available to them and entered fully with commitment into the process of negotiation with Whitehall, it is important to identify the limitations of this approach at this point in time, which we turn to later.
If the NEG framework has had some influence in Whitehall, at least in helping to raise policy interest in cities, what has been the impact of recent developments in 'place-based' approaches? Given the emphasis in the 'rhetoric' in local growth about local places, it might be expected that the influence might be increasingly strong.
The Emergence of 'Place-Based' Approaches
Several recent major policy reports and papers have been produced advocating 'placebased' approaches (Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009a, b; Barca et al 2012) . For example, the Barca Report has been highly influential in the redesign of European Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-20. 11 While it would be possible to exaggerate the differences between the NEG 'space-neutral' and 'place-based' approaches, there are nevertheless important differences in their underlying frameworks which are rehearsed in detail elsewhere (McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Barca and McCann, 2010; Gill, 2010 ) and can be summarised as shown in Figure Two .
Figure Two -Contrast between 'space-blind' and 'place-based' policy approaches
These ideas draw on different thinking about 'place' and the new economics of institutions. Underlying this approach is a set of important conceptual ideas, which may be summarised.
11 See for example European Commission (2011) on the proposals for the new Cohesion Policy for 2014-20. Barca (2009) effectively argued for a stronger linkage between accountability and autonomy in EU regional policy. He criticised existing EU Cohesion Policy on a number of levels, but in particular argued that EU Cohesion Policy was unable to foster the institutional reforms needed to unlock strong regional development. Ultimately Barca called for a greater public accountability of national authorities, with binding agreements and possible sanctions on issues such as data provision, the setting of clear policy objectives, and greater transparency in conducting policy, all in return for more freedom to tailor and experiment in policy design.
The objective of 'place-based' policy is to promote growth in all regions, based on the principle that it is the performance of the urban system as a whole, rather than that of just relatively successful cities that is significant (Barca, 2009; Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose et al 2012) . For example, the OECD point out those regions with average GDP per capita below 75% of national average accounted for 43% of growth across OECD 1995 -2007 (OECD, 2012 . In a globalised world space and place is seen to be more important (McCann, 2008) . Unlike in a NEG model, which sees the urban system as homogeneous, the place-based approach presents it as heterogeneous, shaped by the distinctive geographical, historical, cultural, social and institutional settings of different places. The capacity of territories to root their economic activity into the local institutional fabric will be at the heart of their economic success, since the generation, acquisition and exchange of knowledge and the life blood of all firms is mediated and reflected in geography. However, knowledge is uncertain and is embedded in localities and needs to be uncovered through participatory and bottom-up processes to build consensus and trust (Barca et al, 2012) However, the tendency of the 'state' is to lack both an understanding and knowledge of local places (lacks 'sense of community' (e.g. Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012) , with a consequent weakness in its capacity to adapt its approach towards local places and mediate local consensus and trust between local actors as well as mobilise local resources effectively. Further, it is also prone to the influence of 'capital city' elites in policy making, favouring infrastructure, innovation and sectoral investment for the capital rather than other places (Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012 ). This has the important implication that agglomerations have both natural and unnatural (i.e. policy and resource driven) characteristics.
Beyond the capital city at local levels, 'under-development' traps may occur that limit and inhibit the growth potential of regions or perpetuate social exclusion. This may relate to a failure of local elites to act or because of institutional weaknesses (Barca, 2009 ).
The generation of ideas and appropriate solutions should be generated collaborative endogenously (by local stakeholders) and exogenously (by external actors) leading to explicit spatial targeting of places with appropriate bundles of public goods within a multi-governance approach.
Overall, place-based approaches have two essential underpinnings (Barca et al, 2012) .
Firstly, they see geographical context as key, and that a supposed 'space neutral' policy will always have spatial effects which may undermine policy objectives unless accounted for (ibid). Secondly, knowledge is seen as critical for effective policy development. In reality, such knowledge is not readily available, and as a result policy should aim to stimulate new knowledge and ideas through interactions between local groups and external elites (ibid). On this knowledge attribute, the smart specialisation approach has been closely linked with place-based approaches to regional development policy, at least in how it has been developed in the European context (European Commission, 2011) . In particular, in terms of regional policy it has been used to emphasise the need to exploit related variety, build regional embeddedness and enable strategic diversification. In so doing it stresses the need for regional actors (government, firms, universities, research institutions) to collaborate, recognising the current starting point for the region in terms of skills, technologies and institutional governance and then to build on these capabilities rather than trying to start 'from scratch' (Wolfe, 2011) . This place-based smart specialisation approach therefore has parallels with Rodrik's (2004) perspective of industrial policy as a process of discovery requiring strategic collaboration between the private sector and state in unlocking growth opportunities, but set within a framework of multi-level governance so as to enable a process of local collaboration and discovery while enabling external challenge to local elites engaging in rent-seeking behaviour.
It is not entirely clear how far this 'place-based' framework has yet influenced thinking in the UK. The absence of any serious discussion of the new international literature in a recent UK review of people and place-based approaches would suggest the influence so far has been surprisingly limited (Crowley et al, 2012) . However, as already indicated 
Disconnects and Limitations in the economics behind 'Localism'
In practice a number of disconnects and limitations can be identified in the government's approach. Firstly, the framework underpinning local growth can be viewed as a two Heseltine, 2012) in effect acknowledges). This lack of local power is compounded by the fact that many LEPs also have limited resources, especially those unconnected to a 'core city' with a 'City Deal'. This is particularly the case given that the centrally-distributed
Regional Growth Fund to which LEPs bid has a substantially smaller pot of money available to support regional growth than that which previously went via the RDAs. While the Local Government Resource Review (DCLG, 2011b) did indicate that local authorities will be able to keep any growth in business rates, in the hope that this will create a stronger incentive effect to promote growth, many commentators feel that LEPs need greater finance raising ability (such as bond issuing powers) so as to get things done locally (see APPG, 2012; Bentley et al, 2010) .
Fifthly, part of the rationale for LEPs is that local (or city) economies do not stop at local within their designated LEPs and the consequences of their histories too great, to achieve much progress at such local levels. Indeed, expectations must be of continuing growing divides, even between places in the North and Midlands (see also Crowley et al, 2012) . It is not clear that the second round of City Deals would address this, because the underlying challenge is that the LEP areas are too small to be effective.
Points 5 and 6 together represent perhaps the biggest challenge towards the new framework. A major criticism of the RDAs was that that they were effectively imposed in a top-down and arbitrary way. As a result they were seen as bearing little relationship with functional economic geographies, and were not accountable to localities. RDAs had the 'wrong geography' it was argued. In contrast, the creation of LEPs has been very much a bottom-up driven process, and while potentially helpful in terms of closeness to people and accountability, there is no guarantee that the configuration of LEPs that has emerged has the 'right geography' either. In fact, the new configuration of new LEPs may have just as severe problems over scale and boundaries as the old RDAs, albeit in a different form. 14 A particular challenge now arising is how the 'duty to cooperate' is to be made real. When interactions take place over different scales, how are stronger places going to be incentivised to cooperate with weaker places? That has yet to be made clear in government policy. Yet this cross-border collaboration is essential if the positive elements of RDA experience are not to be lost completely and a place-based smartspecialisation approach can be developed in the context of multi-level governance.
It is difficult to see how this shift to a policy of 'centralised localism' will actually help, for example, clusters in mature industrial regions like the West Midlands compete in the high-skill and high-technology niches that increasingly they occupy (Bentley et al, 2010) . Indeed, it is in the areas of cluster and innovation policy that there may be particular challenges. Part of the problem is that what remains of industrial policy will be based in London, where civil servants are removed from events on the ground and generally lack the capacity to develop appropriate industrial policies for the reconstruction of the manufacturing base (Froud et al, 2011) . The key point here is that RDAs were often better positioned to make judgements about how best to offer support and to which clusters (and/or technologies) as they had a superior information base than central government.
In a sense the opposite may also hold true, in that excessive decentralisation may see an 'all hands in the pork barrel' approach, with a fragmentation of RDAs into much smaller LEPs leading to limited public resources effectively being wasted on a myriad on micro-scale and uncoordinated projects. As Swinney et al (2010) note, only a small number of cities will actually be able to develop specialist clusters in sectors identified as 'high-growth' industries, and they identified a serious "reality gap" in policy. The danger is that many such projects are likely to fail as they will not actually be building on natural historical bases with genuine skill sets that can be re-orientated towards new growth or 'phoenix' clusters (ibid) in a smart specialisation sense. 
Conclusions
This paper has explained why it is important to understand the economics behind LEPs and local growth. As the picture becomes clearer it becomes obvious that there is a mismatch between the rhetoric of local growth and its limitations in practice, so far at least. Local growth (HMG 2010) sets out ambitions to achieve greater spatial and industrial balance across England (and by implication the UK). In practice, however, there are competing economic ideas in circulation within government which have influenced policy in different ways. A 'space-neutral' neo-classical approach in particular has influenced the proposed approach to planning in the NPPF, while a mix of NEG and 'place-based' approaches can be seen as having an impact in terms of documents such as Cities with its proposals for decentralisation to the 'right' level. Quite how far the latter will progress is a key question at the time of writing, especially in the form of City The different experiences of regions in England are the real challenge that we now face.
However, at the moment the thinking behind policy is still incomplete and contradictory.
On the one hand, the 'space-neutral' neo-classical perspective brings out the emphasis on supply side reform and the reduction of costs to enable space for private sector growth. But this does little to address the qualitative improvement in local economies in the regions outside the GSE that we argue is needed. On the other, there is the beginning of a 'place based' approach recognising that the regional cities and their hinterlands might offer potential as important 'places' or sites for endogenous growth.
However, the resulting bottom-up and at times fragmented configuration of LEPs can be criticised -as RDAs were -as having inappropriate boundaries and scales. Moreover, quite how the 'duty to cooperate' is to be enforced is far from clear: just how will stronger places be incentive to cooperate with weaker places? How far the government goes in addressing these issues of powers, resources and governance arrangements will to a large extent determine to what extent the policy 'base' is actually place-based in practice.
